UTPR：在加拿大的有害影響？

編譯：思邁特財稅國際稅收服務團隊

OVERVIEW

概要

This commentary examines harmful effects the 136 country Pillar Two minimum tax project (see footnote 1) could have on Canadian workers and communities.

本評論性文章探討了136個國家的支柱二最低稅率項目（見腳注1）可能對加拿大工人和大眾產生的有害影響。

CONTEXT

背景

Imagine the shock, indignation, and apprehension if a Canadian party were to receive a letter from the Canada Revenue Agency, purportedly based on some new Canadian antiavoidance tax laws, claiming taxes — perhaps in amounts that would bankrupt the party — owed by the party's father and a sibling to one or more other countries (and to be clear not to Canada) on income they derived from those other countries and in which the party contacted has absolutely no interest (either directly or indirectly).

想象一下，如果一個加拿大當事人收到一封來自加拿大稅務局（CRA）的信，據稱是根據加拿大新的反避稅法，要求該當事人的父親和兄弟姐妹向一個或多個其他國家（顯然不是加拿大）繳納他們從這些國家獲得所得的稅款，而該當事人完全沒有從這些國家獲得利益（無論是直接還是間接）。

The party probably would dismiss it as just another of the endless stream of fraudulent/scam communications received every day — that is, until a follow-up was sent by registered mail or other means that the party could no longer just dismiss.

當事人可能會將其視為每天收到的無窮無盡的欺詐/詐騙通信中的另一個，也就是說，直到通過掛號信或其他方式發出后續通知，當事人才不能再隨便拒絕。

And the party would then determine that the demand could be enforced against the party even if the party could not secure a binding undertaking from the father or sibling that they would reimburse the party.

然后，當事人將確定，即使當事人無法從父親或兄弟姐妹那里獲得具有約束力的承諾，即他們將償還當事人的費用，該要求也可以對當事人強制執行。

ENTER PILLAR TWO

進入支柱二

Well, that unthinkable situation must unfortunately now be directly transposed to the affairs of certain Canadian subsidiaries of U.S.- or other foreignbased multinationals and indirectly to employees of such Canadian subsidiaries and the local communities in which they operate as a result of a worldwide OECD led crusade against the tax planning of multinationals that have at least EUR 750 million of gross revenue.

不幸的是，這種不可想象的情況現在必須直接轉化為美國或其他外國跨國公司在加拿大的某些子公司的事務，并間接轉化為這些加拿大子公司的員工和他們運營所在的當地大眾，這是OECD領導的針對總收入至少為7.5億歐元的跨國公司納稅規劃的全球改革的結果。

What Is the Exact Problem?

確切的問題是什么？

A profitable corporation formed in and operating exclusively in Canada (“Canco”) which has always incontrovertibly paid fully and timely every dollar of tax it owes on its profits, may receive from the Canada Revenue Agency a substantial tax bill not related to Canco's own profits (the tax on which all agree has been fully paid) but rather determined and calculated by reference to profits earned in a foreign country (say, Bermuda or the United States or both) by a corporation (say, “Bermco”) owned by the same parent (“USco”) that owns Canco or by the parent itself.

一家在加拿大成立并只在加拿大運營的盈利公司（Canco），一直無可爭議地全額及時繳納其利潤應繳的每一美元稅款，可能會從加拿大稅務局收到大量的稅單，這些稅單與Canco自己的利潤（所有同意全額繳納的稅款）無關，而是參照擁有Canco的同一母公司（USco）或母公司本身在外國（如百慕大或美國或兩者）獲取利潤來確定和計算。

Canco's assets will be depleted — perhaps leading to layoffs of its Canadian employees or jettisoning of expansion plans or insolvency, etc. — by a tax bill related not to its own profits but rather to the profits of a Bermuda corporation which Canco does not own directly or indirectly, or to the profits of its parent USco. In either case, Canco has no interest in such foreign profits, yet may be made to pay tax on those foreign profits. This is totally different than Canco being assessed tax on income of a foreign subsidiary it owns under Canada's controlled foreign affiliate/foreign accrual property income rules, akin to the U.S. CFC/Subpart F rules or under the prime Pillar Two rule — the Income Inclusion Rule.

Canco的資產將被耗盡，也許會導致其加拿大員工的裁員或放棄擴張計劃或破產等，因為稅單不是與它自己的利潤有關，而是與Canco不直接或間接擁有的百慕大公司的利潤或其母公司USco的利潤有關。在這兩種情況下，Canco在這些外國利潤中沒有任何利益，但卻可能被要求為這些外國利潤繳稅。這與Canco根據加拿大受控外國子公司（CFC）/外國應計財產所得規則，類似于美國的CFC/Subpart F規則，或根據主要的支柱二規則：收入納入規則，對其擁有的外國子公司所得進行納稅完全不同。

How Will This Problem Arise?

這個問題將會如何出現呢？

This will arise under new Canadian law, now being drafted, sponsored on October 8 of last year by Canada and 135 other countries — through the OECD (as Pillar Two 15% Minimum Tax) and touted by Canada's Department of Finance in its spring budget as fighting international tax avoidance and ending a “race to the bottom” tax competition between countries. 

這將在加拿大的新法律下出現，該法律目前正在起草中，去年10月8日由加拿大和其他135個國家通過OECD發起（作為支柱二15%最低稅率），并由加拿大財政部在春季預算中吹捧為打擊國際避稅和結束國家間的"逐底"稅收競爭。

But what international tax avoidance has Canco engaged in? NONE. What race to the bottom is Canada engaged in, with an average corporate tax rate of 27%? NONE.

但是，Canco從事了什么國際避稅活動？沒有。加拿大的平均公司稅率為27%，它從事了什么競爭？沒有。

Therefore, it is difficult to see any nexus between the purposes of Pillar Two and the affairs of Canco. That's because, viewed rationally, there is none. Only when the OECD's propaganda is stripped away and the devil in the details is examined does this illogical, inappropriate result come into focus.

因此，很難看到支柱二的目的和Canco的事務之間有任何聯系。這是因為，理性地看，沒有任何關系。只有當OECD的宣傳被剝去，細節中的魔鬼被審視時，這種不合邏輯的、不恰當的結果才會成為焦點。

The Underlying Factors?

基礎因素？

There are three interrelated factors in the USco-Bermco-Canco illustration, above.

在上述美國公司-百慕大公司-加拿大公司的示例中，有三個相互關聯的因素。

First, Pillar Two invites tax havens like Bermuda to impose a 15% tax on its companies owned by large multinationals. If it does, the saga ends. If it doesn't — on to factor two.

首先，支柱二招致像百慕大這樣的避稅天堂對其大型跨國公司擁有的公司征收15%的稅款。如果它這樣做了，這個故事就結束了。如果它不這樣做——就進入第二個因素。

That (factor two) is the basic Pillar Two rule (the Income Inclusion Rule) that, absent the first factor (Bermuda levelling a 15% tax), the parent of Bermco — USco — should pay to the U.S. government 15% of the income of Bermco. But the United States has not adopted the Pillar Two rule — even though the Biden Administration favours it — because of opposition in Congress (namely from Democratic Senator Joe Manchin who vetoed it in the recent “Inflation Reduction Act,” as discussed in the Portman article cited in footnote 3).

這（因素二）是基本的支柱二規則（收入納入規則），即如果沒有第一個因素（百慕大征收15%的稅款），Bermco的母公司——USco——應該向美國政府繳納Bermco所得的15%。但美國沒有采用支柱二規則——即使拜登政府贊成——因為國會的反對意見（即民主黨參議員Joe Manchin在最近的《通脹削減法案》中否決了該規則，如腳注3中引用的Portman文章中所討論的）。

The United States has a separate rule (the 2017-enacted Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) rule) which will impose a 10.5% U.S. tax on USco in respect of Bermco's income. But that 10.5% falls short of the requirements of Pillar Two (it has paid only 10.5% not 15%) and that brings us to the third and fatal factor of Pillar Two and the depletion of Canco.

美國有一個單獨的規則（2017年頒布的全球無形低稅所得（GILTI）規則），該規則將對美國公司就Bermco的所得征收10.5%的美國稅款。但這10.5%沒有達到支柱二的要求（它只繳納了10.5%而不是15%），這使我們想到支柱二的第三個致命因素和Canco的耗損。

That (third factor) is Pillar Two's bizarre notion — which is being legislatively adopted by Canada — that if a foreign corporation (here Bermco) that is the subsidiary of another foreign corporation (here USco) has earned income in its foreign country but between those two foreign countries a full 15% tax has not been paid, the shortfall (4.5% of Bermco's income — or perhaps greater per footnote 5) can be claimed against a third company (Canco) by the country where Canco is based just because Canco is owned by the parent (USco) of the foreign company (Bermco) that earned the foreign income. 

這（第三個因素）是支柱二的奇怪概念——加拿大正在立法采用——如果一個外國公司（這里是Bermco）是另一個外國公司（這里是USco）的子公司，在其外國獲取了所得，但在這兩個外國之間沒有全額繳納15%的稅款，那么差額（Canco公司所得的4.5%，或者根據腳注5可能更大）可以由Canco公司所在的國家向第三家公司（Canco）索賠，僅僅因為Canco公司是由獲得外國所得的外國公司（Bermco）的母公司（USco）擁有。

WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE THE CANADIAN PARTY?

這讓加拿大當事人情何以堪？

This surreal and essentially untenable result will, upon enactment, be part of Canadian law and govern Canco, unless (1) Canco can successfully sue Canada for unlawfully expropriating or confiscating its property under the transparent guise of taxing Canco on phantom imaginary non-existent income or (2) Canco can invoke tax treaty protection.

這一超現實的、基本上站不住腳的結果在頒布后將成為加拿大法律的一部分，并制約著Canco，除非（1）Canco能夠成功地起訴加拿大在對Canco虛構的不存在的所得征稅的透明幌子下非法征用或沒收其財產，或者（2）Canco能夠援引稅收協定保護。

The expropriation (confiscation) notion merits a bit of discussion. It stems from but is different from comments made by Dr. Catherine Anne Brown at a recent Canadian Tax Foundation seminar on Pillar Two respecting whether foreigninvestor rights under international investment agreements might be a basis for foreign investors to challenge Pillar Two. 

征用（沒收）的概念值得討論一下。它源于但不同于Catherine Anne Brown 在加拿大稅收基金會最近一次關于支柱二的研討會上發表的評論，即外國投資者在國際投資協議下的權利是否可以成為外國投資者挑戰支柱二的依據。

Here, the question is whether a domestic Canadian taxpayer has any right under Canadian domestic law to challenge the Canadian government for levying a tax under domestic law based on Pillar Two tax.

這里的問題是，根據加拿大國內法，加拿大國內的納稅人是否有權利質疑加拿大政府根據支柱二稅收的國內法征稅。

Dr. Brown looked at a foreign investor in Canada who claims, under an international investment agreement, that a Canadian tax law (here one related to Pillar Two) amounts to an indirect expropriation or confiscation of the investor's property. So this is dealing with a foreign party and an investment agreement and a claim against Canada. The focus here has no foreign claimant nor an investment agreement, but only a potential Canadian claimant and Canadian domestic law — hypothetically a Canadian corporation being levied tax by Canada under the UTPR because its foreign parent owed top-up tax but it had not adopted Pillar Two.

Brown博士研究了一個在加拿大的外國投資者，他根據國際投資協議，聲稱加拿大稅法（這里是與支柱二有關的稅法）相當于間接征用或沒收投資者的財產。因此，這是在處理一個外國當事方和一個投資協議以及對加拿大的索賠。這里的重點是沒有外國索賠人或投資協議，而只有一個潛在的加拿大索賠人和加拿大國內法——假設一家加拿大公司被加拿大根據UTPR征稅，因為其外國母公司應繳補足稅，但它沒有采用支柱二。

The objective would be to have UTPR overturned as an invalid expropriation, under Canadian laws (without regards to any international law or treaty). Arguably, this is expropriation or confiscation because the Canadian subsidiary has no direct or indirect interest in the income of its foreign parent or foreign subsidiary of its foreign parent in respect of which Canada is claiming a payment from Canco.

其目的是根據加拿大法律（不考慮任何國際法或協定），將UTPR作為無效征用而被推翻。可以說，這是征用或沒收，因為加拿大子公司在其外國母公司或其外國母公司的外國子公司所得中沒有直接或間接的利益，而加拿大正就這些所得向Canco要求繳納。

The statute under which Canada is making the UTPR claim may be called an income tax statute — but is it not a sham claim, because Canco has no interest and never will have an interest in the income on which the claim against Canco is based? Is it not pure expropriation or confiscation without compensation? Is Canco an innocent pawn in a massive hunt, orchestrated by OECD, for tax dollars?

加拿大提出UTPR要求所依據的法規可能被稱為所得稅法規——但這難道不是一種虛假的要求，因為Canco在對Canco提出要求所依據的所得中沒有利益，而且永遠不會有利益？這難道不是純粹的征用或無償沒收嗎？Canco是OECD策劃的大規模獵取稅款活動中的一只無辜的棋子嗎？

Quite apart from any domestic law relief under the notion of expropriation is the question as o whether there is a tax treaty block. The notion is that, in the hypothetical UTPR issue discussed herein, Canco could claim exemption under Article Vll of the Canada-U.S. Income Tax Treaty, which says “the business profits of a resident of [the United States] shall be taxable only in [the United States] unless the resident carries on business in [Canada] through a permanent establishment situated therein.”

與征用概念下的任何國內法救濟完全不同的是，是否存在稅收協定的阻礙。這個概念是，在本文討論的假想UTPR問題中，Canco可以根據《加拿大-美國所得稅協定》第Vll條要求豁免，該條規定“[美國]居民的營業利潤應只在[美國]納稅，除非該居民通過位于[加拿大]的常設機構在[加拿大]開展業務”。

That would seem to say Canada cannot apply the UTPR here. But can Canada argue as follows?

這似乎是說加拿大不能在這里適用UTPR。但加拿大是否可以這樣辯解？

First, the assessed party under the Canadian Income Tax Act is the Canadian sub of the U.S. parent (and is not the U.S. parent) and it is only that Canadian sub that can ask a Canadian court to use a provision of the Canada-U.S. treaty to override the operation of the Income Tax Act.

首先，《加拿大所得稅法》規定的被評估方是美國母公司的加拿大子公司（而不是美國母公司），只有該加拿大子公司才能要求加拿大法院使用加美協定的規定來推翻所得稅法的實施。

However, not only is it generally understood that a treaty to which Canada is a party cannot affect the manner in which Canada can tax its own residents (here the Canadian sub), but that notion is specifically confirmed by Article XXIX(2) of the Canada-U.S. treaty.

然而，人們不僅普遍認為，加拿大作為締約國的協定不能影響加拿大對其居民（這里是指加拿大子公司）征稅的方式，而且這一概念在加美協定第XXIX（2）條中得到了具體確認。

Second, a totally different argument is that Canada is not simply/merely adding the profits of the U.S. sub (measured under usual Canadian tax accounting rules) to the usual taxable income base of the Canadian sub and applying the usual corporate tax rates, but instead it is mechanically calculating against the Canadian sub a claim which in substance is totally weird and different (and gives very different results) from the usual claim and is simply not contemplated by the treaty.

其次，一個完全不同的論點是，加拿大不是簡單/單純地將美國子公司的利潤（根據加拿大通常的稅務會計規則計量）計入加拿大子公司通常的應稅所得稅基，并適用通常的公司稅率，而是機械地對加拿大子公司計算出一個實質上與通常的申報完全不同的申報（并給出非常不同的結果），而且根本不是協定所設想的。

Finally, the probability that, in our illustration, USco will make Canco whole does not reduce the inappropriateness of this aspect of the Pillar Two 15% minimum tax proposals, which elsewhere have been criticized as being against Canadian interests.

最后，在我們的示例中，美國公司將使加拿大公司得到補償的可能性并沒有減少支柱二15%最低稅率建議的這一方面的不適當性，這些建議在其他地方被批評為有損加拿大的利益。

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

結論性建議

The issue discussed above is a significant part of the 180degree turn Canada is making from a 50year-old tax policy that sought by its design to foster Canada's economy by encouraging, through tax measures, both outbound and inbound investment.

上面討論的問題是加拿大從50年的稅收政策中180度大轉彎的一個重要部分，該政策的設計旨在通過稅收措施鼓勵對外投資和對內投資，從而促進加拿大經濟。

The imposition of Pillar Two taxes under either the prime Income Inclusion rule (referred to only briefly above) or the harmful UTPR discussed above is a far cry from the true and tested approaches adopted since the massive 1972 tax reform. This highlighted the essentially tax-free environment for outbound and the reasonably measured set of rules for inbound.

根據主要收入納入規則（上文僅簡要提及）或上文討論的有害UTPR征收支柱二稅款，與1972年大規模稅制改革以來所采用的真正和經過測試的方法相去甚遠。這突出了走出去的基本免稅環境和引進來的合理計量的一套規則。

There is growing concern that this 180degree turn is simply not in Canada's interest — whether for the reasons discussed above or otherwise.

越來越多的人擔心，這種180度的轉彎根本不符合加拿大的利益，無論是出于上面討論的原因還是其他原因。

溫馨提示：非官方翻譯，如有不同理解，請以英文版為準！